Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 5-28 – Colin D. Robinson – “Why the Afghan and Iraqi Armies Collapsed: An Allied Perspective”
From Decisive Point Podcast · · 10 min
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Description
In this episode, Colin D. Robinson discusses American and Western liberal ideas (ideological views) and politics in relation to the obstacles faced in rebuilding the Afghan and Iraqi armies. This podcast reviews the differences between Western liberal democracies and partner states, the politics of counterinsurgency, and army accounts.
E-mail usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.
Podcast record date: September 26, 2024
Keywords: liberal peace, Afghan National Army, Iraqi Army, security sector reform, security force assistance
Episode transcript
Stephanie Crider (Host)
You're listening to Decisive Point (https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Podcasts/Decisive-Point-Podcast/). The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.
Joining me virtually today is Colin D. Robinson, author of “Why the Afghan and Iraqi Armies Collapsed: An Allied Perspective,” (https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol54/iss3/7/) which you can find in the Autumn 2024 (https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol54/iss3/1/) issue of Parameters. Robinson lectures on defense leadership and management at Cranfield Defense and Security at Cranfield University, Shrivenham, United Kingdom. He began his tracking of Operation Enduring Freedom while at the Center for Defense Information in Washington, DC, in 2002.
Welcome to Decisive Point, Colin.
Colin D. Robinson
Thank you so much.
Host
In your view, what were the most critical structural weaknesses that led to the collapse of the Afghan and Iraqi armies? How could these have been addressed more effectively by their respective governments or allied forces?
Robinson
The structural weakness was politics. Iraq was split between Sunni, Shia, and Kurd. And, the parties interested in the Afghan army were split between the Tajiks and the Uzbeks and less-than minorities and networks of political party affiliation in the armed forces, which led to different political parties having the loyalty and patronage and financial links to different sets of generals within what was the Afghan National Army.
One of the other critical points was the disbandment of the Iraqi army under Coalition Provisional Authority [CPA] Order No. 2, which has historically now been seen as an enormous, enormous mistake. There were plans in place to use the existing remnants of the Iraqi army that still existed by the time Baghdad had fallen, and US Army senior leaders were liaising with their generals. The most recent research I have seen attributes the origins of CPA Order 2, potentially, to Ahmed Chalabi, clearly through Ambassador Paul D. Bremer.
The question is, did the United States try to set up a mirror-image state army along the lines of Western armies or try to build forces that took more account of the political realities? In thinking about this, one has to remember that the Kurdish forces, now, in what is the Kurdish zone of Iraq, are still split down the middle between two separate factions.
Host
Some have attributed the failure of these armies to issues of leadership, issues of corruption.
How much responsibility do you think should be placed on these internal factors compared to the external military pressures?
Robinson
General Colin Powell, later Secretary of State, had something he called a “Pottery Barn rule.” You break it, you own it. So, at least equal responsibility can be divided between the United States and its allies, including the United Kingdom, and on the other side, Iraqi and Afghan actors because the United States firstly created the whole Iraqi mess in 2002 and 2003 for no real justifiable reason, as we now know, in my view. And secondly, as [State Department representative Carter] Malkasian and [David] Kilcullen and Mills have noted, the United States and its allies did not…