
Decisive Point Podcast
U.S. Army War College Public AffairsAudio
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About this show
Decisive Point, the Parameters podcast companion series, furthers the education and professional development of senior military officers and members of the government and academia who are concerned with national security affairs. Questions or feedback? E-mail usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil
Show details and episodes come from the publisher's public feed at feeds.blubrry.com. Last updated . Names, artwork and text belong to their publishers.
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Episodes
Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 7-7 – Allison Abbe – “Perceiving a Competitor: Culture and Cognitive Biases of the Strong Enemy and the Pacing Threat”
· 18 min
The United States and China show distinct patterns of cultural cognition that shape their perceptions of the security environment and of each other. In this podcast episode, Dr. Allison Abbe discusses theories from cross-cultural psychology to national security, highlighting sources of misperception in competition. Recommendations covering education, recruiting and retention, perspective taking in practice, and long-term workforce development will help defense institutions achieve US cognitive advantage in the Indo-Pacific. Keywords: culture, cognitive bias, mirror imaging, cultural cognition, strategic empathy, perspective taking, cognitive flexibility Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point (https://www.army.edu/USAWC/CSL/SRAD/Media/Podcasts/Decisive-Point/). The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Dr. Allison Abbe is in the studio with me today. She is professor of organizational studies and the Matthew B. Ridgway Chair of Leadership Studies at the US Army War College. Her research focuses on development of leadership and intercultural skills in national security leaders. She speaks and teaches about strategic leadership, cross-cultural competence, and organizational climate. Thank you for joining me today, Dr. Abbe. Allison Abbe Thanks so much for having me. It’s good to talk with you again. Host What inspired you to write this monograph? Abbe So, there were two sources of inspiration for this monograph. One came out of conversations with students in our China integrated course, which we’ve been teaching since academic year 2024. We focus heavily on strategic culture and history about China, as well as some war gaming. In conversations with students, it was clear that they were really searching for simple narratives and simple explanations about the behavior of China as an actor. Some of that was evident in mirror imaging and making some assumptions about adversary motives and behavior that I thought needed a little bit more understanding. The second source has come from conversations that I’ve had after I published an article in Parameters a few years ago, and that article looked at strategic empathy and perspective taking in conceptual terms. And, conversations with intelligence organizations and other organizations after that article indicated that there was more need to understand the “so what” of those concepts. So, what does it look like when we apply strategic empathy and perspective taking in the context of trying to understand our competitors and adversaries? So, those were two intersecting sources of inspiration for this monograph. Host How will this monograph benefit US war fighters? Abbe There are benefits at two levels—that individual level and the enterprise level. So, at an enterprise level, I really hope that the monograph will prompt some reconsideration of programs and approaches that used to be in place but have been defunded or are just missing now that some reorganizations have happened. For example, there are some courses that used to be available in red teaming and things like that. So, I’m hoping that at an enterprise level, we could relook at some of those capabilities and programs. At the individual war fighter level, there’s always a need to better understand our adversary, our competitors, just to understand the strategic environment a little better. There’s some suggestions in the monograph about how we can go about slowing down cognition and recognizing when we might have some blind spots about our adversaries. Host You mentioned a moment ago mirror imaging. What is mirror imaging, and what role does it play in the US-China relationship? Abbe Mirror imaging is the tendency for each side in a competition or conflict to characterize their counterparts in very negative and often very similar terms. So, we…
Not rated yetDecisive Point Podcast – Ep 7-6 – Thomas Bruscino – “War Fighting: The Case of Ulysses S. Grant”
· 27 min
In this episode, Thomas Bruscino argues that American military professionals must focus on war fighting in publishing about military history to bring their unique military perspectives to the study of war. Bruscino uses the historical example of American professional military writing and teaching from the American Civil War to World War II about General Ulysses S. Grant to demonstrate the value of analyses focusing on war fighting, especially relative to popular and academic histories of Grant’s military leadership. Keywords: military publishing, professional military education, Ulysses S. Grant, military leadership, military strategy Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point (https://www.army.edu/USAWC/CSL/SRAD/Media/Podcasts/Decisive-Point/). The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Joining me today is Dr. Thomas Bruscino, a historian and professor in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the US Army War College and author of “War Fighting: The Case of Ulysses Grant,” which you can find in the Autumn 2025 issue of Parameters. Welcome to Decisive Point. Dr. Thomas Bruscino Thank you. Glad to be here. Host So, today we’re looking through the lens of your research to discuss how military leaders can lead the revitalization of professional military writing and institutional memory. You note that after World War II, professional military writing largely lost its influence outside the US Army, and schoolhouses then turned toward broader policy issues. Today, for a senior officer who sits at the intersection of policy and execution, how can they use professional publishing to project unique military perspectives back into broader academic and popular strategic discourse? Bruscino What I was noticing, doing research on World War I and World War II, areas that I do a lot of work on (and I’m a big fan of Ulysses S. Grant—particularly the 1864 campaigns and the strategy for the last year of the [Civil] War) is that the folks writing before studying in the military schoolhouses prior to World War I, and in the interwar period prior to World War II, did a really good job of understanding Grant [and] the way that he approached the campaigns. And, the reason I think they were good at doing that is because they were able to put themselves into the positions. They didn’t think so much in terms of levels of war the way we do now, where we talk about strategy and operational art and tactics, and they focused more on what it would mean to be a field army commander or a theater commander. And in doing that, in focusing on positions, as opposed to saying, “I’m a strategic leader, I’m a field army commander, or in a field army staff,” or “I’m on a” what we now call a “Joint Task Force or a theater command.” And, since they did that, they were able to put themselves into the shoes of Grant. And in doing that, they were able to really bring that unique perspective that only military officers and military professionals really have because they’re putting themselves in that position. So, when they write from that perspective, they bring something unique and valuable to the wider discussions that are academic, popular, [and] that are out there because we have a tendency to boil it down in popular (and even a lot of academic writing) just to big arrows on maps, sort of hand-wave versions of this. But, by putting themselves in those positions, they really empathized with the subject because they have that view that they’re going to be that person someday and that they needed to understand it that way. And, I think in doing that, they bring this perspective that is missing in a lot of the stuff out there. And so, this has been a longtime thing of teaching military professionals and thinking about these issues. I’m always in this [mode] and…
Not rated yetDecisive Point Podcast – Ep 7-5 – Jason Jabbari – “What the Russia-Ukraine Conflict Tells Us About Educational Resilience”
· 11 min
Education is often only examined within a single domain before, during, and after armed conflicts, limiting the use and effectiveness of civil-affairs operations. In this episode, Jason Jabbari discusses a framework of the primary mechanisms across unique domains by which education can serve as a key area of resiliency or vulnerability and addresses the costs, benefits, and potential roles military civil affairs can play in a post-conflict scenario. Keywords: education, armed conflict, human rights, civil affairs, vulnerabilities and resiliencies Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point (https://www.army.edu/USAWC/CSL/SRAD/Media/Podcasts/Decisive-Point/). The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Jason Jabbari is joining me today. Jabbari is an assistant professor at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri, and serves as a public education officer at the 353rd Civil Affairs Command, US Army Reserve. He holds a PhD in education from Washington University and a master of education degree in school leadership from Harvard University. Jabbari is the founding director of the Center for Education Research, Practice, and Policy Partnership at Washington University and the faculty director of community engagement at the Clark-Fox Policy Institute. Welcome to Decisive Point, Dr. Jabbari. Jason Jabbari Thanks for having me. Host Why should military planners look beyond human capital or economic growth when evaluating a conflict zone’s educational system? Jabbari Yeah, that’s a great question. So, we know from research that human capital isn’t enough. We know that educated societies can fall to extreme ideologies. Economic growth doesn’t guarantee [and] democracy doesn’t guarantee stability. We have some examples—especially in our recent past. We could think about the suicide bombers during 9/11, [and] elite institutions, you know, in Nazi Germany. And so, we know that just post-secondary education, years of schooling, and human capital really doesn’t lead to democracy or stability. So, I think we need to adopt a much wider lens to understand how education functions pretty broadly in a society. Host You also document how Russia has imposed its curriculum and national identity in occupied territories. How can local civil affairs operations actively counter this specific type of political weaponization of schools? Jabbari We have some recent evidence linking education in Ukraine to how Russia is using schools and using students to try to “Russify” different parts of Ukraine. We can think about imposed curriculum, using propaganda to kind of attempt to erase Ukrainian identity, [and] forcing students over 18 as draftees. We can view this as a weaponization of the political domain, right? School [are] being [used as] an attempt to flip places where democratic socialization can occur into tools of extremism. And, I think that the goal here is to think about how this can be countered. How can democratic education [effect change]? Schools for democracy, youth for democracy, these are programs in Ukraine that have really adapted to wartime with online delivery. And, I think here, you know, for civil affairs, we’re thinking about commanders downrange. And, I think data like this can be used to pinpoint [the fact] that schools may be used for indoctrination or child-soldier recruitment, which might have implications for military engagements. And so, here, it’s important to note that civil affairs is not just about post-conflict rebuilding. It’s about providing information that battlefield commanders can use, again, or not use. The point here is to provide a broad set of information, and I think the Ukraine example is a good one because it does demonstrate how education is being used, or attempted to be used, by Russia in the current war. Host Let’s talk…
Not rated yetDecisive Point Podcast – Ep 7-4 – Lucas Ziller – “A Hybrid Deterrence Model for Countering China”
· 20 min
In this podcast episode, Lucas Ziller contends that the current US deterrence-by-denial strategy is insufficient to deter China from attempting forcible unification with Taiwan, due to its neglect of ideological and psychological drivers in the Chinese Communist Party’s decision-making calculus. He introduces a hybrid deterrence framework that integrates denial and punishment across domains, coordinated by a Joint Interagency Organization. Keywords: deterrence, interagency, China, Taiwan, operational-level planning Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point (https://www.army.edu/USAWC/CSL/SRAD/Media/Podcasts/Decisive-Point/). The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Joining me today is Major Lucas Ziller, author of “A Hybrid Deterrence Model for Countering China,” which you can find in the Winter 2025–26 issue of Parameters. Ziller is an Infantry officer serving as a battalion operations officer in the 82nd Airborne Division. He has served in units within US Central Command, US Special Operations Command, and US Army Forces Command. He holds degrees from the University of Toronto, the University of Kansas, the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, and the US Army Command and General Staff College. Welcome, Lucas. Lucas Ziller Thank you. Appreciate you having me. Appreciate the opportunity. Host I’m glad you’re here. Your article argues that the current US deterrence-by-denial strategy suffers from critical flaws. Why does a purely military, force-centric posture fail to resonate with the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) decision-making calculus? Ziller Appreciate that question. So, I wrote the article primarily because I felt that there was a fairly simple question that my research drove me towards. And that’s, you know, is the US trying to deter China from forced reunification with Taiwan in a way or a method that China actually makes decisions? I think a lot of discussion about Taiwan focuses on the military capabilities of all sides. How many ships are involved? How many missiles? How many aircraft? How many troops all sides have? Those things absolutely matter. I’m not trying to argue otherwise, but deterrence isn’t just about military capability. It’s also about psychology. It’s about how a adversary perceives things like costs, risk, and opportunities at hand. So, the more I studied both deterrence theory as well as Chinese strategic thinking, the more I felt that there was a gap between the United States deterrence approach vis-à-vis [China’s] forceful reunification with Taiwan. I think US policymakers assume Beijing will evaluate a Taiwan contingency primarily through a rational cost-benefit calculation, but Taiwan is tied to a Chinese regime, legitimacy, nationalism, [and] Chinese Communist Party identity. Because of that, military costs alone may not have the desired deterrent effect that US policymakers are looking for. So, that led me to ask whether the American approach towards deterrence is complete. And, my conclusion wasn’t that deterrence by denial is wrong, necessarily, it’s that now, by itself, [deterrence by denial] probably isn’t enough, and that kind of drove my analysis as well as my conclusion/recommendations. Host Your article highlights how Beijing views Taiwan not just as a strategic interest but as a moral imperative central to regime legitimacy. How does this moralization of national interests alter China’s willingness to absorb immense material losses? Ziller One thing that stood out to me as I was researching the article is that not all interests are equal. Countries, whether it’s [the] United States or China, routinely negotiate over trade, resources, or territory, but when the leaders of those countries begin to frame the issues in moral terms, or historical terms, compromise between those countries…
Not rated yetDecisive Point Podcast – Ep 7-3 – Erik A. Davis – Drones and the Changing Character of War
· 21 min
Cheap drones have transformed the character of war by creating a “mass effect” that challenges traditional principles of force concentration. Drawing on lessons from Ukraine, historical theory, and production trends, Erik A. Davis explains why the production of cheap “precision mass” is expected to accelerate. Keywords: drone, sense, strike, mass, Jevons Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point (https://www.army.edu/USAWC/CSL/SRAD/Media/Podcasts/Decisive-Point/). The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I am speaking remotely with Colonel Erik A. Davis, author of “Drones and the Changing Character of War,” which you can find in the Winter 2025–26 issue of Parameters. Davis has more than 16 years’ experience in US Army special operations. Davis has more than 16 years’ experience in US Army special operations. He is a General Wayne A. Downing scholar, whose assignments have taken him from village stability operations in Afghanistan to preparing for high-end conflict in the first island chain. He is currently in command in Japan, and he writes about data in the Army at https://www.downrange-data.com/. Welcome to Decisive Point, Colonel Davis. Colonel Erik A. Davis Thank you very much, Stephanie. Thank you for having me. Host What inspired you to write this article? Davis Mostly a debate. A couple years ago, I was a senior service college student in ’24, but [I was] heavily influenced by the debate about were drones impactful or not and, if so, why? Host In your article, you note that “you need mass to take and to defend objectives, but on a battlefield littered with cheap drones, that same mass gets you killed.” How should commanders navigate this paradox when trying to capture a heavily fortified position? Davis Credit where credit is due, I really borrowed heavily from Dr. Jack Watling on that one. He’s a RUSI researcher from the UK (United Kingdom). I highly recommend anything he’s written, but he said that when I was in senior service college. I was a fellow in Australia, and he said it to the audience there, and it was a really impactful idea because he’s been arguing [this point] for a while. There’s been a talk about whether this is offense or defense [that] has the advantage right now. And he’s like, it’s not an offense/defense thing. It really comes down to the ability to sense and deliver fires on an offense or a defense. And so, we’ve kind of changed—where we used to have the mass rule, most students I think, are very familiar with the 3 to 1 for an assault. And, that’s not really the math problem anymore. It is [that] you have a time period that affects how effective that mass is. You need to mass forces. You can’t take an objective without them, but at the same time, then you have to disperse afterwards, and how do you sustain and maintain everything—logistics, the security, all of that. And so, weirdly enough, it actually brings me a little more to my SOF [special operations forces] roots, where (Admiral William H.) McRaven had what was called “relative superiority,” and the idea was why SOF works. It works because it only works for a short amount of time. I don’t think that the rest of the military has gotten to that short amount of time, but I do think the rest of the military has to start thinking about that relative superiority. If you have a mass, it’s giving you advantage. However, it’s also starting to draw in enemy and resources, and you’ve got to disperse it. Host You also discuss in your article how Jevons’ Paradox and the Red Queen Effect are fueling a relentless race in military innovation. For our listeners who might not know, could you explain what are Jevons’ Paradox and the Red Queen Effect and then a follow-on—given how quickly adversarial drone tactics adapt, what specific changes should the US military make to…
Not rated yetDecisive Point Podcast – Ep 7-2 – Troy J. Bouffard and Lester W. Grau – The Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor
· 29 min
What is the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor and why does it matter to the United States? What does it mean for global trade? Troy J. Bouffard and Les Grau explain. Keywords: Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor, Russia, China, Northern Sea Route, global economy Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point (https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Podcasts/Decisive-Point-Podcast/). The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m talking remotely with Troy J. Bouffard and Lester W. Grau, coauthors with Charles K. Bartles and Mathieu Boulègue of “Russian Arctic Land Forces and Defense Trends Redefined by NATO and Ukraine,” which was published in the Autumn 2025 issue of Parameters. Bouffard (US Army, retired) has a master’s degree in Arctic policy and a PhD in arctic defense and security from the University of Alaska Fairbanks, where he’s an assistant professor of Arctic Security. He is the director of the University of Alaska Fairbanks Center for Arctic Security and Resilience and a research fellow with the United States Military Academy’s Modern War Institute. Grau (lieutenant colonel, US Army, retired) specializes in Russian military studies and is a senior analyst for the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has a PhD from the University of Kansas in Russian and Central Asian history. He has written numerous books and articles on tactical, operational, and geopolitical subjects. The last time we were here, we were talking about your Parameters article. For listeners, if you’re interested, the podcast about the article is episode 6-3. For decades, Russia treated the Northern Sea Route as its national transport artery. Now, it’s talking about the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor. What exactly is this corridor, and why does it matter to the United States and countries like Russia, Europe, and China? Troy J. Bouffard Yeah, the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor is quite significant. This is a major shift in Russian policy from the Kremlin. Since last century on, and formally, more recent decades, the Northern Sea Route was mentioned by [then–Soviet Union President Mikhail] Gorbachev on October 1, 1987, as part of what he called the “zone of peace” for the Arctic region. But, [he] planted that seed that the Northern Sea Route was gonna be the epicenter of how that worked. And then, with time, it became part of federal law exactly what the Northern Sea Route was, according to Russia. And then, it built its international case legally, and otherwise, on how it would manage the Northern Sea Route and—just as important—access to it. And, this has frustrated the West because it deviated from the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and freedom of navigation rules. But Russia had a very strong case because they were consistent. Changes to that definition, though, were a bit of a challenge. Several years ago, Putin had mandated that 80 million tonnes [of cargo] needed to be shipped through the Northern Sea Route by a certain date. And, up to that point, the record had been only about 10 million tonnes. And, that caused a lot of problems for Russian officials who scrambled, knowing that there’s no way, by the due date, that 80 million tonnes could possibly be shipped through the Northern Sea Route, which was largely symbolic, but a strategic move by Putin to show how important the Northern Sea Route was. They got busy and got clever on trying to change the definition of the Northern Sea Route to extend it because it only goes from the Kara Gate[s] to the Bering Strait and doesn’t include, formally, the part of the Barents Sea—where most maritime activity actually happens. So, they tried to extend the definition, and Putin would have none of it because he knows, in accordance with international law, if you change the definition of something like…
Not rated yetDecisive Point Podcast – Ep 7-1 – Gareth Prendergast and John A. Nagl – Turning Tactical Victories into Strategic Success: Counterinsurgency in the Irish Civil War, 1922–23
· 22 min
The fundamentals the Irish National Army used in the Irish Civil War (1922–23) are a model for the successful application of a classic counterinsurgency which, if understood earlier, could have made a difference in the United States’ most recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. John A. Nagl and Gareth Prendergast explain. Keywords: counterinsurgency, Ireland, Irish Civil War, military strategy, treaty Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point (https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Podcasts/Decisive-Point-Podcast/). The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I am speaking with Gareth Prendergast and John A. Nagl today. Prendergast is a serving colonel in the Irish Army and the author of Clear-Hold-Build: How the Free State Won the Irish Civil War Nagl is the General John J. Pershing Professor of Warfighting Studies in the Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations at the US Army War College. They coauthored “Turning Tactical Victories into Strategic Success: Counterinsurgency in the Irish Civil War, 1922–23,” which you can find in the Summer 2026 issue of Parameters. This podcast has been a long time in the making. Thank you both for showing up today. John A. Nagl Delighted to be here, Stephanie. Gareth Prendergast Hello, Stephanie. Host Let’s just start at the beginning. How did you two meet? Prendergast I met John at a conference in, Ireland, well, 15 years ago. And, I’d heard all about him. I’d read his book. I bought him a pint of Guinness, and we were chatting at the bar for the evening in the officer’s mess. I felt we obviously made a connection. So, a few years later, when I asked him if he’d like to write the foreword to my book, he was very generous, and he said he would—but I had to invite him to Ireland and buy him a pint of Guinness. So, I did that. Nagl That seemed reasonable to me. It seemed like a reasonable ask on my part. Prendergast Yeah. So, I met him in Ireland, and he says, “Oh, you’re not the guy I remember. You’re a different person.” So… But he still came all the way over to Ireland, and he still wrote the foreword to my book. And, I hope we’ve become good friends ever since. And, I would like to thank him. Nagl Yeah, Gareth and I have spent time together, both, on his island and, here in the United States. And, I was really honored to write the foreword to his book, which is another example of the basic principles of counterinsurgency being applied to a case that many people on this side of the Atlantic don’t know very well. And, it illustrates, to me, the enduring value of the counterinsurgency doctrine that General David Petraeus, General Jim Mattis, [Dr.] Conrad [C.] Crane of our own Army War College, [and] a number of people wrote, now 20 years ago. And, that continues to, I think, influence how—not just the American military, but a number of militaries around the world—think about this very challenging kind of war. Host Why did you decide to write this article? Prendergast It’s primarily from my book. And, I just wanted to highlight to people in America (and to a newer audience) the dangers, first of all, of a civil war and how you can blindly follow an ideology, or your leadership, as it happened in the Irish Civil War, into a vicious encounter—even though you don’t fully understand what you’re fighting for. And, I also wanted to demonstrate how the clear-hold-build philosophy that was developed by the Americans during the Iraq conflict actually worked during the Irish Civil War. And, I thought the Irish Civil War, as John said earlier, would be a very good case study to study clear, hold, build. And, when John offered to write an article with me, I [said], “Yeah, this would be fantastic to do it in such a prestigious magazine as Parameters.” And it’s just a pleasure to be able to…
Not rated yetDecisive Point Podcast – Ep 6-10 – Henry Sokolski – “A Case for Military Proportionality: Disabling Nuclear Plants”
· 18 min
In this episode, Henry Sokolski discusses how proportionality can serve as a concrete tool for winning wars and maintaining alliances and defines the roles the Lieber Code, the Geneva Conventions, precision weapons, and public narratives play in warfare. Keywords: proportionality, civilian infrastructure, nuclear targeting, military strategy, international law Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point (https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Podcasts/Decisive-Point-Podcast/). The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests, and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Henry Sokolski is joining me remotely today. Sokolski is the author of “A Case for Military Proportionality: Disabling Nuclear Plants,” which was published in the Autumn 2025 issue of Parameters. He is the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and has worked in the Pentagon as the deputy for nonproliferation policy, as a consultant to the National Intelligence Council, as a member of the CIA's Senior Advisory Group, and as a senate military and legislative aide. He is also the author and editor of numerous volumes on strategic weapons proliferation issues. Welcome back, Henry. Henry Sokolski [It is] good to be back. Thank you for having me. Host In your article, you argue that proportionality should not just be viewed as an abstract legal or moral constraint but as a concrete tool for winning wars. How does a commander distinguish between a strike that is legally permissible under the Lieber Code—which focuses on military necessity and protecting civilians, among other things—but is strategically self-defeating in the long run? Sokolski Well, first of all, who is Mr. [Francis] Lieber? Well, he advised President [Abraham] Lincoln, and he wanted to have a code that was more civilized than the European military codes—particularly on the question of, you guessed it, slavery. But along the way, he wanted to make sure that other things were attended to, like the unnecessary harassment and abuse of civilians and the things critical to civilian life. The Lieber Code basically became international law later. So, this guy is very important to understanding the law of war. Now, in there, he made this effort to protect civilians and civilian objects. However, he knew that commanders would do what they would do, and he gave them a get out of jail card, if you will, a free pass. Well, if they think it’s militarily essential to hit something that might cause a lot of harm to civilians or the objects they need to survive, it’s okay. It becomes extremely subjective. So, I don’t think there’s any problem for someone to do something legal under the Lieber Code. They’re given wide swath, as long as they can claim (or insist) that they had to do it. However, the distinction would be not so much between the Lieber Code and what makes sense but, rather, simply trying to understand what victory requires in the way of military operation. In this case, I think most military experienced hands can tell the difference between achieving the objective by avoiding aggravating the locals, if you will—by killing innocents unnecessarily and destroying civil objects that are not critical to winning the military objective—or achieving it and not. And, those military hands can actually see someone misbehaving and discipline them and say, “Stop doing that.” I think that it’s much more along those lines than some kind of legal determination. So, for example, if you destroy a dam or you spew radioactivity on the field that you have to march over, you’re marching slower, it gets in the way of what you need to do. And of course, it harms the civilians that are, you know, underneath the water or exposed to radiation. If you want to repatriate quickly and restore services, destroying something would make far less sense than temporarily disabling…
Not rated yetDecisive Point Podcast – Ep 6-9 – Tim Devine and Jonathan Gerson – on “Restoring the Primacy of Army Mobilization Planning: Lessons from the Interwar Period (1919–41)”
· 30 min
In this episode, Tim Devine and Jon Gerson argue that the US Army must restore the primacy of mobilization planning to prepare for the growing likelihood of a protracted large-scale war involving the United States. While the Army’s transformation initiatives have emphasized important tactical matters, Devine and Gerson call attention to critical strategic vulnerabilities associated with mobilization—one of the Army’s enduring core functions. They offer insights, identify challenges, and offer recommendations for contemporary leaders and practitioners by analyzing the body of thought on mobilization planning during the interwar period (1919–41) and drawing connections to the present day. Keywords: mobilization, strategic planning, large-scale war, readiness, Interwar Period Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point (https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Podcasts/Decisive-Point-Podcast/). The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Today we’re discussing national mobilization. While the United States military pivoted to an era of great-power competition years ago, the strategic environment continues to evolve. Joining us remotely today is Lieutenant Colonel Tim Devine, an active-duty Army strategist, author of “Restoring the Primacy of Army Mobilization Planning: Lessons from the Interwar Years, 1919–41,” which was published in the Summer 2025 issue of Parameters. He has strategic planning experience on the Army Staff and in the Indo-Pacific and is currently an instructor at the Army’s Command and General Staff College. Tim, welcome. Tim Devine Thanks, Stephanie. It’s a pleasure to be here. Host We’re also joined by Colonel John Gerson, a Title 10 National Guard officer and senior planner at the National Guard Bureau. He brings experience from several key assignments in the Joint Staff, the Army War Plans Division, the office of the Secretary of Defense (now Secretary of War), and the Guard Bureau. John, thanks for joining us. Jonathan Gerson Thanks, Stephanie. Thanks for inviting me on. It’s always great to share the mic with Tim. Host Tim, your article is the foundation for our conversation today. In it, you argue the Army must restore the primacy of mobilization planning. To start, could you summarize why you believe looking back 100 years to the interwar period is so crucial for the challenges the Army faces right now? Devine Absolutely. And first, I’ll emphasize that I’m a practitioner. I’m not a professional historian, but I was struck just by how much of this history is relevant for our contemporary time. Right after World War I, it was really the last time that the Army had to build a mass mobilization model almost from scratch. And World War I mobilization was chaotic and, although it was ultimately successful, there was a long list of shortcomings that illuminated the need for systematic reform. And, this experience had a profound effect on those who took part, particularly those in the Army who later held prominent roles throughout the interwar years—so, Chiefs of Staff like [General] John [J.] Pershing, General [Douglas] MacArthur, [General Malin] Craig and, of course, General George [C.] Marshall. And, each of them advanced proficiency in strategic planning in their own way. Now, fast forward to today, and there’s a lot that we can apply from this period. And, even during my time in uniform, which is approaching the 20-year mark, I’ve lived through the Army’s shift from the two decades of counterinsurgency to renew the focus on large-scale combat—or LSCO, as we call it. And given this shift institutionally, it’s clear that the Army is wrestling with how to prepare its forces for the growing likelihood of these potentialities. This impacts everything—how the Army organizes itself, how we train our forces, how we equip them, how we…
Not rated yetDecisive Point Podcast – Ep 6-8 – Antulio J. Echevarria II and Brennan Deveraux – Standing Up the Strategic Competition Center
· 17 min
In this episode, Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II and Major Brennan Deveraux discuss the Strategic Competition Center, its mission and anticipated activities, and Echevarria's inaugural Strategic Competition Corner article. Keywords: intrastate strategic competition, interstate strategic competition, doctrine, National Security Strategy, Joint Concept for Competing Stephanie Crider (Host) You are listening to Decisive Point (https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Podcasts/Decisive-Point-Podcast/). The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the United States Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m in the studio with Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II and Major Brennan Deveraux today. Echevarria is currently a professor of strategy at the US Army War College. He has held the General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research and the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies and is the author of six books on military strategy. Deveraux is a US Army strategist serving as a national security researcher at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). He has three defense-related master’s degrees and focuses his research on military innovation, emerging technology management, and the characteristics of future warfare. Brennan, over to you. Brennan Deveraux Thanks, Stephanie. So, today I’m going to have the opportunity to sit down and talk to Dr. Echeverria about a new center that we’re standing up at the Strategic Studies Institute—the Strategic Competition Center. We’re gonna talk about why that’s important, what it is, and what it means for our listeners. So, real quick, before we really dive into the center, Dr. Echevarria, if you could just tell me a little bit about why you’re pushing for this change. You’ve been with the (US Army War College) Press now for over a decade. Why the switch? What’s your motivation? Antulio J. Echevarria II Yeah, well, after 12 years as editor of Parameters and then editor in chief of the Press, I decided it was time to get back to what really got me into this business in the first place, which is researching and writing, trying to tackle tough security questions, and offering the best solutions I could. I missed all of that and so, I’m really looking forward to getting back into it. So, that was really the genesis. Deveraux Okay. And, I heard you joke the other day, maybe [this change involves] a shift to focusing on your work versus putting all that time into everyone else’s. Echevarria Yeah. Yeah. Instead of trying to fix everybody else’s [work], I can finally focus on trying to fix my own, and we’ll see where that goes. Deveraux Yeah. Yeah. Well, as [an] aspiring young author, I’ve enjoyed your feedback when you were fixing my own. Hopefully, we can replace you. So, let’s talk [about] the Strategic Competition Center. What is it and, kind of, why? The defense community has been talking about great-power competition for years. Do we need a new center? And then, why here at the Army War College? Echevarria I think it was General [James N.] Mattis who helped reorient the defense community away from counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations and to great-power war, great-power competition, which then became strategic competition, back in his National Defense Strategy some years ago. It was not a knock on our efforts to do counterinsurgency and counterterrorism better, as the years went on. It was really to widen our aperture and to provide more strategic context for these kinds of missions and their potential outcomes and effects moving forward. So, it really is to broaden the aperture here at the Army War College, provide a service that connects practitioners, strategists and scholars, students, faculty members all together, and play on a little bit of that synergy, working [with] everyone together. So, that’s why here and why now. Deveraux Okay. So, you can…
Not rated yetDecisive Point Podcast – Ep 6-7 – Mahdi Al-Husseini, Samuel J. Diehl, and Samuel L. Fricks – On “Bridging Sky and Sea: Joint Strategies for Medical Evacuation in the Indo-Pacific”
· 25 min
This podcast contends that the US Army should coordinate agile and expeditious Joint medical evacuation operations in the Indo-Pacific and develop novel capabilities to do so effectively. Keywords: medical evacuation, maritime operations, novel capability, World War II, Joint health service Host (Stephanie Crider) You are listening to Decisive Point (https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Podcasts/Decisive-Point-Podcast/). The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m talking with Mahdi Al-Husseini, Samuel J. Diehl, and Samuel L. Fricks today, authors of “Bridging Sky and Sea: Joint Strategies for Medical Evacuation in the Indo-Pacific,” which was published in the Spring 2025 issue of Parameters. Al-Husseini was previously the director of the Medical Evacuation Doctrine Course for the Department of Aviation Medicine. He’s now a PhD student at Stanford University in aeronautics and astronautics, with a follow-on as an experimental test pilot. Diehl was the commander of the 3rd Battalion, 25th Aviation Regiment, and following the US Army War College, where he’s currently a student, he will be assigned as Medical Command G5. Fricks serves as the chief of the Medical Evacuation Concepts and Capabilities Division and is responsible for air and ground evacuation modernization. Welcome to Decisive Point, gentlemen. Samuel L. Fricks Thank you. Samuel J. Diehl Thanks. It’s great to be here. Host Why did you write this article, and why is now the time? Fricks The character of war is changing rapidly. Observations from the battlefield in Ukraine have shown that traditional ways of doing things don’t work, necessarily, when you’re under constant observation. Why we wrote the article was, we have to change the way that we do medical evacuation, specifically—or especially—in the Indo-Pacific, in order to really have a chance. Mahdi Al-Husseini One of the ways we open up the article is by saying what is old is new again, and what is new changes everything, and I think that’s especially true in the context of medical evacuation in the Indo-Pacific. When we look back at World War II, which I would argue is one of the best case studies that we have, in terms of this particular problem set and this particular theater, a lot of what was true and relevant then continues to be true and relevant now. And, we see that on the tactical level. We see that on the strategic level. We see that across echelons and across mission sets. And yet, despite that, I think so many things as, no doubt, Colonel Diehl and Colonel Fricks will allude to in a little bit, so many ways that our enemy operates has changed, right? And, those things need to be considered as well. And so, what we’re dealing with here is, I think, a very gnarly problem, and one that affects the lives of servicemembers. You know, I do think we’re at something of a junction point, and we need to be able to ensure we have the resources, the doctrine, the training necessary to ensure that when that next conflict comes, we are prepared for it. And, that’s another reason we really wanted to bring this article out to a larger community. Samuel J. Diehl And, I’ll give credit to Mahdi where it’s due that when I took command in May of 2023, he was already working towards a degree of experimentation and integration—both with joint partners, as well as with the Army Theater Sustainment Command—about how we tackle this problem, sort of at the micro/tactical level, more effectively from an integration standpoint, but then also how do we integrate and test new technologies? As a career MEDEVAC [medical evacuation] pilot, I thought what he was doing was really exceptional, but I also understood institutionally, you know, where Colonel Fricks is coming from [in saying] that we have, you know, something of an obligation to get…
Not rated yetDecisive Point Podcast – Ep 6-6 – Bruce Busler and Ryan Samuelson – Deploying and Supplying the Joint Force from a Contested Homeland
· 30 min
In this podcast, Bruce Busler and Ryan Samuelson argue that the United States must prepare for “the fight to get to the fight,” focusing on deploying and maintaining military forces from a contested homeland amid near-peer threats. Keywords: USTRANSCOM, Transportation Command, contested homeland, conflict, Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise Stephanie Crider (Host) You are listening to Decisive Point (https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Podcasts/Decisive-Point-Podcast/). The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College or any other agency of the US government. I’m talking remotely with Mr. Bruce Busler and Mr. Ryan Samuelson today. Busler is the former director of the Joint Distribution Process Analysis Center, or JDPAC, and the US Army’s Transportation Engineering Agency, or TEA. He’s the author of “Deploying and Supplying the Joint Force from a Contested Homeland,” which was published in the Spring 2025 issue of Parameters. Samuelson is the current director of JDPAC and TEA, USTRANSCOM (US Transportation Command), at Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. Let’s start at the beginning. What do JDPAC and TEA do? Ryan Samuelson Sure. Well, Stephanie and Mr. Busler, thank you very much. You know, JDPAC is . . . it’s the analysis center for the combatant command. It’s the analysis center that allows us to fulfill our Unified Command Plan responsibilities. And so, we bring engineering and analytical work together both with JDPAC and the Transportation Engineering Agency, which TEA is focused on improving the employability and sustainment of the Joint Force by providing the Department [of War] expert engineering analysis, policy guidance, and additional analysis. And so, when you take an engineering center from the combatant command and the analysis center and combine that with the Transportation Engineering Agency, what you have is a fusion of the ability to look at engineering solutions and then also to look at how we are moving from predictive to prescriptive analytics to ensure that the Joint Force can deploy and sustain itself. Host Mr. Busler, I’m really interested in how you came to write this article, but also why it matters for the Parameters [and] Decisive Point audience. Bruce Busler About two years ago, I had the chance to speak at a conference that was hosted by the [US] Army War College that involved many of the service and Joint players that were addressing homeland defense topics and the ability to project power from the homeland. And, as an outgrowth of that conference, I was asked to write a journal article, which I was happy to do, because I really wanted to help people understand what is it that TRANSCOM and JDPAC and TEA were doing on behalf of the Joint Force to be able to operate from a contested homeland. And, that was really becoming a point of awareness of the fact that we’re [no longer] going to operate with impunity. It’s just an administrative activity to get the Joint Force to the airfields and seaports and get them into the fight. And so, what I wanted to do was kind of capture my thoughts and then help people see the great work that was being done at TRANSCOM on behalf of the broader community to ensure we could prosecute this mission. In the article, I kind of distill my thoughts into three key areas. First of all, how we understand and minimize the impact of high-consequence events, versus all the potential points of disruption, so that we can continue to operate when we are going to be disrupted—and it’s not if, but when, we’re going to be disrupted—and then, also, how that works with all of the providers we have. So, the first point was minimizing the impact of high-probability / high-consequence events. The second one was maximize how this thing called the Joint Deployment Distribution Enterprise can continue to operate with all of our providers. And, we have to…
Not rated yetDecisive Point Podcast – Ep 6-5 – Frank G. Hoffman and Antulio J. Echevarria II– The 2026 National Defense Strategy
· 24 min
Military strategists Dr. Frank G. Hoffman (retired) and Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II analyze the 2026 National Defense Strategy. Host (Stephanie Crider) You are listening to Decisive Point (https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Podcasts/Decisive-Point-Podcast/). The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m talking with Dr. Frank G. Hoffman and Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II today. Hoffman is the author of “The Next National Defense Strategy: Mission-Based Force Planning,” which was published in the Summer 2025 issue of Parameters. He recently retired from the federal government after more than 46 years of service as a Marine, civil servant, and senior Pentagon official. His last post was at the Institute for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. Echevarria is currently a professor of strategy at the US Army War College. He’s held the General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research and the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies and is the author of six books on military strategy. So, Dr. Hoffman, a lot has happened since we published your article. I’m really looking forward to this conversation today. My first question, in fact, did you get what you were hoping for from the new National Defense Strategy [NDS]? Dr. Frank G. Hoffman Yes, [I am] satisfied. I have a certain sympathy for folks who write strategy documents, and so, I know how difficult it is, and I know that these documents have to talk to many audiences. And, you know, you could chop up the 10, 12 pages of actual texts of the summary that’s out there and see that it’s talking to the White House, that it’s talking to allies, it’s talking to adversaries, it’s talking to commercial vendors. I mean, it has a lot of audiences, and I’ve seen a lot of criticisms, and I’m sympathetic because I’ve been in the shoes of [those] trying to edit or craft a couple of these in my prior life. But, I was pleased with the framework. It has some clarity to it. I think like Dr. E. [Echevarria], I took out all the op [operations] art terminology from the 2018 Strategy, things like lines of effort and things that aren’t as strategic, and I tried to, you know, visualize a theory of success for our strategy. And, I don’t get that necessarily out of these four elements, but the way they are clearly stated and prioritized, I agree with that, and it’s largely in sync with my article—with some improvements. Host I feel very fortunate to have two such esteemed strategists in the studio with me today, and I'm curious how each of you see theory informing the recently published NDS. And also, where do theory and force planning realities collide most sharply? Hoffman On the theoretical part, dealing with strategy per se, you know, one of the things I’ve written about, I think Dr. E’s written about [it], too, is the importance of a theory of success, which I think deals with the ways of a strategy. Of course, it’s also important to have coherence between the ends, ways, and the means. One of the reasons I was writing my article over a year ago was the insolvency problem, which really deals with the means gap. So, I don’t see an overarching integrated theory of success for the four elements, but I do see—particularly for the China component of the strategy—a clear theory of success expressed. The foundation for that was in the 2018 Strategy. It’s [from] some of Mr. [Elbridge A.] Colby’s writings in his book in the past. So, I see that imprinted in there, and that’s the part of theory that I see practically employed in the Strategy. But I do think that the NDS Summary, as I understand it—I understand it’s just a shell and the budget hasn’t been submitted, but I don’t see the Strategy as written for closing the insolvency gap very much. It’s not a compelling or persuasive story for Congress to fund the gaps that I’ve…
Not rated yetDecisive Point Podcast – Ep 6-4 – Ilmari Käihkö, Jan Willem Honig, and Antulio J. Echevarria II – Ukraine’s Not-So-Whole-of-Society at War: Force Generation in Modern Developed Societies
· 29 min
This podcast argues that Ukraine offers a cautionary tale regarding the two main modern models of force generation. Neither the professional high-tech war model, favored by Western militaries, nor the whole-of-society war approach, said to have saved Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, proved successful formulas for Ukraine. Considering that Ukraine is fighting for survival, with Russian forces inside the country, the failure of both models in action has serious implications for NATO member states as they deliberate their choices regarding future force generation. Stephanie Crider (Host) You are listening to Decisive Point. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m in the studio with Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria today. Joining us remotely are Dr. Ilmari Käihkö and Jan Willem Honig. Käihkö and Honig are the authors of “Ukraine's Not-So-Whole-of-Society at War: Force Generation in Modern Developed Societies (https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol55/iss1/4/),” which was published in the Spring 2025 issue of Parameters (https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol55/iss1/4/). Käihkö is an associate professor of war studies, guest researcher at the Swedish Defense University, and a guest researcher at the University of Helsinki, Finland. He’s also a veteran of the Finnish Defence Forces. Honig is professor of international security studies, emeritus, at the Netherlands Defence Academy and a visiting professor in the Department of War Studies, King’s College London. Echevarria is currently a professor of strategy at the US Army War College. He has held the General Douglas MacArthur Chair of Research and the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies and is the author of six books on military strategy. Welcome to Decisive Point. Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II For the benefit of our listeners, would you two please summarize your article for us? It’s been a while, just to refocus everyone. Jan Willem Honig What we tried to explain was that, where as we all expected and thought that initially Ukraine, as a society, mobilized and resisted the Russian attack in 2022, it very quickly turned out that it was a very partial mobilization of Ukrainian society [and] that very limited parts of the population, largely volunteers with a regular element, managed to stop and resist and turn back some of the invasion. And that was something that seemed to be very important because not only was it the case that Ukraine struggled to mobilize all of society in a case of a war that should be the most clear-cut that you could imagine [as] it is a war of aggression. You would expect the population to rise up against this invading force. [It] didn’t quite happen, but it provides us with warnings and potentially lessons [about] whether we can mobilize as a population when we need to. But also, it reflects on Russia, where people don’t tend to realize maybe [the] extent to which the Russians also struggle to mobilize their population [and] that the numbers of forces on the Russian side that fight on the frontline is also very limited. And the result of that is a very particular type of war, not the high-technology professional type of war that we tended to project on what the Russians would do but also how we have prepared—and are still preparing—to fight warfare. It turned out that in the case of Ukraine, neither side could fight this high-intensity, militarily decisive, high-technology, professional type of war. That holds a second major sort of warning lesson for the West, in our view, that not only can’t we rely, in all likelihood, on all of society to mobilize and fight, but we probably can’t also rely on our professional high-technology forces to successfully fight war. Echevarria Ilmari, did you want to add to that? Ilmari Käihkö Yeah, I think this was a very good summary of the…
Not rated yetDecisive Point Podcast – Ep 6-3 – Troy J. Bouffard and Lester W. Grau – Russian Arctic Land Forces and Defense Trends Redefined by NATO and Ukraine
· 21 min
This podcast argues that Russia’s Arctic land forces have been weakened by the Russia-Ukraine War and NATO’s northern expansion, creating a strategic window for Western militaries to bolster their Arctic capabilities. Unlike existing studies that focus on maritime operations and the Northern Sea Route, it integrates technical assessments of ground-based Arctic platforms with analysis of military-district reforms. Using a mixed methodology that incorporates equipment specifications, Russian government documents, media reports, and NATO strategic-response evaluations, this podcast constructs a comprehensive baseline understanding of Russia’s Arctic land-force potential and readiness. Policy and military practitioners will benefit from actionable insights into Arctic force-design shifts, equipment vulnerabilities, and strategic recommendations to exploit the temporary imbalance between NATO and Russian readiness. Stephanie Crider (Host) Welcome to Decisive Point (https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Podcasts/Decisive-Point-Podcast/). The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m talking remotely with Troy J. Bouffard and Lester W. Grau, coauthors with Charles K. Bartles and Mathieu Boulègue of “Russian Arctic Land Forces and Defense Trends Redefined by NATO and Ukraine,” which was published in the Autumn 2025 issue of Parameters. Bouffard (US Army, retired) has a master’s degree in Arctic policy and a PhD in Arctic defense and security from the University of Alaska Fairbanks, where he’s an assistant professor of Arctic security. He is the director of the University of Alaska Fairbanks Center for Arctic Security and Resilience and a research fellow with [the] United States Military Academy’s Modern War Institute. Grau, lieutenant colonel (US Army, retired) specializes in Russian military studies and is a senior analyst for the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has a PhD from the University of Kansas in Russian and Central Asian history. He’s written numerous books and articles on tactical, operational, and geopolitical subjects. I’m happy you’re here. Thank you for joining me, Troy and Les. Lester W. Grau Thank you. Troy J. Bouffard Thank you. Host Please give our listeners a brief recap of your article. Bouffard Well, we wrote this because there were significant baseline circumstances involving Russia’s Arctic interest in the defense side, especially with land forces. When Sweden and Finland joined NATO, it had a profound effect, I think, on the Kremlin, and we saw immediate reactions that were significant strategically. One of those was the fact that Russia, in previous years, had established a new military district for the Arctic. It was the Northern Fleet District. It was a joint Arctic-type military district, which is strategically significant. They did this in 2014, and it remained provisional until 2021, when it became full equal status to the other four military districts. Then in 2024, they dissolved it immediately—right after Sweden and Finland joined NATO. Grau The indications are, however, they’re not giving up on the Arctic. As a matter of fact, since the article was written, the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade has disappeared and been replaced by the 71st [Guard] Motorized Rifle Order of Kutuzov Division in Pechenga, [Murmansk Oblast]. A division is larger than a brigade. [Russia is] not as constrained as we would be in developing a new division in that the logistics structure of the brigade and the division are the same. It’s the [ground-combat] folks [being added]. However, what they already had [was] three brigades in a corps when this whole Ukrainian thing started and now, it looks like they’re going to have at least two divisions—the naval infantry division and this division up in the Arctic. So, when…
Not rated yetDecisive Point Podcast – Ep 6-2 – Neil N. Snyder and Charles “Chuck” Allen – The Consequences of Declining Patriotism in the United States
· 36 min
In this episode, Colonel Neil Snyder and Charles “Chuck” Allen discuss declining patriotism in the United States, highlighting generational and veteran–nonveteran gaps revealed in Snyder’s research. They explore how patriotism influences trust in the military, the challenges of building that trust, and the roles of leadership, communication, and shared values in bridging divides. Both emphasize that leaders must make people feel valued, engage authentically across generations, and anchor service and purpose in the Constitution and the American people. Host (Stephanie Crider) You are listening to Decisive Point (https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Podcasts/Decisive-Point-Podcast/). The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m in the studio with Colonel Neil Snyder, and Charles “Chuck” Allen is joining us remotely. Snyder is the author of “The Consequences of Declining Patriotism in the United States,” which was published in the Autumn 2025 issue of Parameters. Allen culminated a 30-year Army career as [a] director [in] leader development, and retired as the professor of leadership and cultural studies in the Department of Command, Leadership, and Management at the United States Army War College. We are exploring today what shifting attitudes toward patriotism mean for trust, service, and leadership and how leaders can respond constructively. Neil, Chuck, what’s the one insight you hope leaders take away from the podcast today? Colonel Neil Snyder Well, first off, I want to thank you for having me on, and for Chuck Allen for doing this. It’s an honor to be with you, sir. I would just say for me, I’m a social scientist. People fascinate me, and I suspect that for a lot of the listeners, they’re super interested to know what makes other people tick. And, that’s what I’m interested in. Today, we seem to be living in fairly divisive times. And so, I’m interested to know what are the things that are dividing Americans. And so, my research in this article is about Americans’ values. And candidly, what I was hoping to find were sources of unity—the ties that bind us all together. And in many ways, that’s what I did. However, I also found that our values may be dividing us in some fundamental ways, the old from the young and the veterans from nonveterans, over a key issue that is truly important to national identity [and] to our national security. And that’s the value [of] patriotism. And so, if there’s one thing that I would hope listeners would take away, [it] is [that] I hope to inspire some curiosity. I hope that we can have conversations in an open, respectful way about values, to find those things that unite us and to find ways to bridge those things that divide us. Host Love that. Charles “Chuck” Allen I’m glad to be with you, Stephanie and Neil. It’s a great day to talk about this idea of patriotism and also our national values. My primary insight would be the importance of understanding that civil-military relations in the United States includes the connection of our military institution to society and to our nation. The US military, we must remember, exists to protect and serve the American people and its government as a first principle, and that requires trust, a trust which is grounded in the United States Constitution. So, that’s the one takeaway I think we want to focus on—trust in the Constitution and our responsibilities as a protective force for our nation. Host Neil, your article shows patriotism is declining among some groups. What surprised you most about these trends? Snyder Yeah. This is a . . . it’s a good question. And like I said, this article is really about curiosity, and the article itself is about values. And so, [we will benefit] if we operationalize or conceptualize values as our beliefs about ideals, but also ideals that…
Not rated yetDecisive Point Podcast – Ep 6-1 – Neil N. Snyder – Tyranny of the Inbox: Managing the US National Security Agenda
· 22 min
Presidential management style, foreign policy preferences, and domestic political interests all affect the national security agenda. International crises, however, are particularly likely to garner the attention of the National Security Council. This podcast analyzes a novel data set of all the issues raised at National Security Council meetings from 1947 to 1993 and finds that contemporaneous crises are very likely to be discussed, but that crisis management attenuates the Council’s attention to noncrisis national security matters. The results suggest presidents focus on crises at the expense of other strategic matters, and they do so when political conditions favor crisis management. Keywords: national security, presidency, international crises, political science, strategic studies Stephanie Crider (Host) You are listening to Decisive Point (https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Podcasts/Decisive-Point-Podcast/). The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m in the studio with Colonel Neil Snyder, author of “Tyranny of the Inbox: Managing the US National Security Agenda,” (https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol55/iss1/8/) which was published in the Spring 2025 issue of Parameters (https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol55/iss1/8/). Snyder is an assistant professor in the Department of National Security Strategy at the US Army War College. Let’s just go ahead and get started. You describe in your article how international crises dominate presidential attention, often at the expense of broader strategic issues. What are the long-term risks of this crisis-driven focus for US national security planning? Colonel Neil Snyder If I could, maybe I’ll back up and just kind of start with my intuition and my curiosity and why I was doing this research at all. And, it’s something that my guess is that many of the Parameters readers and [Decisive Point] listeners will relate to, which is the simple intuition that crises can dominate your life. When you are attending to crises, it seems to crowd out all of your other priorities, and I think leaders have this natural intuition whereby when you’re stating priorities, you’re actually talking about the things that . . . It’s a choice. You’re stating which you’re not going to do, what you’re going to defer or just table completely. And, I had this abiding curiosity of whether or not that was happening to us in the national security and strategy realm, too. It’s kind of like this tyranny of the inbox where, maybe how you and I might manage our e-mail, where if you just answer every e-mail that comes in, in the order in which it comes in, it’s not exactly a dominant strategy for managing your e-mail, right? You’re not choosing to spend your time on those important messages—the ones from family or the ones about your bank accounts or something that might matter the most. You’re just sort of managing the flow that comes in. That tyranny of the inbox can happen two ways—[by] attending to the things that are unimportant or, alternatively, focusing on only the most urgent thing that popped into your inbox at the expense of everything else that might matter to you. Eisenhower had this concept of Eisenhower’s window [The Eisenhower Matrix]. I’m sure many of the readers have seen it, where it’s this matrix, a two by two of the urgent versus the important. And, I kind of had this intuition that, in the national security world, we focus almost exclusively on the things that are urgent and important to the expense of those things that are important but not urgent. And, I wondered whether that was actually true or not. So, my curiosity started [not] with a question of whether or not [but] how the US relates to the world. And how we manage national security is affected by a kind of crisis myopia by which we are…
Not rated yetDecisive Point Podcast – Ep 5-35 – Shang-Su Wu and Collin Koh – The Philippines’ Security in the Face of China’s Rising Threats
· 20 min
Dr. Shang-Su Wu and Dr. Collin Koh discuss the ties between the Philippines and Taiwan and how the Philippines would be affected in a conflict between Taiwan and China. Their discussion also delves into topics such as military modernization in the Philippines and US involvement in the Philippines. Keywords: Philippines, Taiwan, China, Philippine-Taiwan relations, security, military modernization Disclaimer: This transcript has been edited for clarity. Stephanie Crider (Host) You are listening to Decisive Point (https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Podcasts/Decisive-Point-Podcast/). The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Joining me virtually today are Dr. Shang-Su Wu and Dr. Collin Koh. Wu is the author of “The Philippines’ Security in the Face of China's Rising Threats (https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol54/iss4/6/),” which was published in the Winter 2024–25 issue of Parameters. He's an assistant professor and research coordinator in the Homeland Security Program at Rabdan Academy in Abu Dhabi. Koh is [a] senior fellow at the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) based in Nanyang Technological University. He primarily researches maritime security and naval affairs in the Indo-Pacific region, focusing on Southeast Asia. Welcome to Decisive Point. Dr. Shang-Su Wu Thank you Dr. Collin Koh Thank you Host Tell me about the security connection between the Philippines and Taiwan. What are the likely scenarios that might play out in Taiwan, and how would these different scenarios impact the Philippines? Wu Generally, if China wants to use force against Taiwan, there's probably two most likely scenarios. The one is a blockade, then another—of course, after a blockade or certain fire projection—[is to] try to eventually do the invasion. So, deployment of the US military near to Taiwan, no matter in Okinawa or in the Philippines, they [are a] dilemma [for] China because China, on the one hand, if they want to constrain the conflict [bilaterally], just go straight. Yes, they would not like to attack, but on the other hand, that means their flanks are opened for the intervention for the attack. On the other hand, if you want to extend the conflict, then, of course, the scale will be much bigger, the outcome will be much worse, or the risk much higher. In that case, they have to pay very [close] attention on military deployments. And, in the past, of course, the Philippines remained less relevant because most invasion [scenarios] remain focused on Taipei, the northern part of Taiwan. So, Japan’s side will be important, but nowadays, if they are doing a blockade (of course, if they are surrounding the island), they would also [employ] the longer range of the weapon systems for the munitions. So, even the northern part [of Taiwan] would be under the firepower [deployed from] the Philippines. That’s why the US military deployment in the Philippine would matter a lot. But, on the other hand, the Philippines have various weakness. The one weakness is their armed forces haven’t been modernized since, generally, between the 1980s to the 2000s or early 2010s. So nowadays, their capability is still weak, especially compared to China. And, you know, they have the maritime disputes over various islands, and China may use that to press the Philippines. Another issue is [that] the Philippines likes to export the labor force for their economy. And in Taiwan, they [have] at least 154,000 Filipino workers. China may use these people as a kind of hostage to threaten the Philippines. And in 2003, the Philippines quit Operation Iraqi Freedom [because] al-Qaeda threatened the Filipino workers overseas, and there could be a similar situation [in Taiwan someday]. So, that makes the US…
Not rated yetDecisive Point Podcast – Ep 5-34 – Michael Fitzpatrick and Hugo Harvey-Valdés – On “Korea and the Arsenal of Democracy” and “Allies, Partners, or Puppets?: American and Chilean Armies, 1961–69”
· 25 min
In this episode, authors Dr. Michael Fitzpatrick and Dr. Hugo Harvey-Valdés compare the transatlantic partnerships between the United States and West Germany in the 1970s, the US and South Korea in the 1970s and 80s, and the US and Chilean armies’ relations in the 1960s. They discuss the successes and struggles of those partnerships and the strengths and limits of American influence during these time periods. Keywords: history, partnerships, Cold War, Post-Cold War, Federal Republic of Germany, South Korea, Chile, foreign policy, defense industry, political indoctrination Stephanie Crider (Host) You are listening to Decisive Point (https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/decisive-point-podcast/id1691139400). The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m speaking remotely today with Hugo Harvey-Valdés and Michael Fitzpatrick. Both were authors of articles featured in the Historical Studies forum in the Winter 2024–25 issue of Parameters. Dr. Hugo Harvey-Valdés, full professor and researcher at the University of Los Americas Santiago, held a variety of field and academic positions during 27 years of active military service before retiring in December 2020. He is the author of “Allies, Partners, or Puppets: American and Chilean Armies, 1961–69.” Dr. Michael Fitzpatrick is a postdoctoral fellow at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and supports the Defense POW-MIA Accounting Agency. Fitzpatrick wrote “Korea, Germany, and the Arsenal of Democracy.” Welcome to Decisive Point. Thank you for joining me. Michael Fitzpatrick Thank you for having me. Hugo Harvey-Valdés I appreciate the invitation. Thanks a lot for having me. Host What drew you to study these particular aspects of US foreign military policy? Fitzpatrick I was drawn to this subject because I think the relationship between the US and its allies is so important to the crafting of contemporary foreign policy. I think, in the last several presidential administrations, Americans have really tried to reconsider their alliance relationships. And, I think that the actual mechanics of these relationships are often understudied in the historiography. And, I think that this is such an important subject and an interesting subject because I see a lot of overlap between the West German situation in the 1970s and the South Korean situation. The strategic outlook in both of those regions is very similar. And yet, American policy and American actions in those countries—and the result of American policy and action in those countries—is often radically different. And so, this creates an interesting opportunity for study and an interesting opportunity for comparison. Host Hugo, what was your inspiration? Harvey-Valdés When I was working on my doctoral dissertation that was about President [Eduardo Frei Montalva’s] foreign policy between 1964 and 1970, I analyzed many declassified documents from the United States and Chile, which showed that Chile was not above its state—I mean that Chile didn’t follow the US guidelines in foreign or domestic policy. Despite the millions of dollars that Frei Montalva received from economic aid plans and that supported his presidential campaign in his first years in office. Then, I asked myself, “If the politicians developed independently, why would the military have faithfully followed US demands?” Furthermore, in my own exchanges and training with the US Army, I never felt any intention to influence or ideologize my military thought. Therefore, I realized that there was a need to reassess prevailing narratives that have depicted the relations between American and Chilean armies during the Cold War, especially during [the] Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Host Michael, give us an overview of US military involvement in Korea and Germany. What were the strategic…
Not rated yetDecisive Point Podcast – Ep 5-33 – Justin Malzac – Korea: The Enduring Policy Blindspot
· 23 min
The threat posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a neglected and under-prioritized problem across the US government, requiring a dramatic change of approach. Most proposals for Goldwater-Nichols reform focus on geography, either increasing or decreasing the number of geographic commands. Based on our personal experience as Joint military planners at strategic-level headquarters, we argue that the change needs to go further, focusing on global national security problems instead of geography. This article’s analysis and conclusions will provoke conversation across the national security enterprise about how the United States competes with multiple global threats. Keywords: North Korea, South Korea, Goldwater-Nichols reform, National Defense Strategy, force structure Disclaimer: This podcast was recorded March 28, 2025, prior to the election of South Korea’s current president, Lee Jae Myung, in June of 2025. Stephanie Crider (Host) You are listening to Decisive Point (https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Podcasts/Decisive-Point-Podcast/). The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. I’m talking remotely today with Justin Malzac, coauthor with Rene A. Mahomed of “Korea: The Enduring [Policy] Blindspot (https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol54/iss4/4/),” which you can find in the Winter 2024–25 issue of Parameters. Malzac is a senior information planner and policy adviser for the Department of Defense in Korea. He’s also a historian with a focus on East Asia. His history work on Korea has been published in the International Journal of Korean Studies and other venues. Welcome to Decisive Point, Justin. Justin Malzac Thanks for having me, Stephanie. Unfortunately, my coauthor, Rene, could not be here today due to scheduling issues, but I’m going to try to make sure that I bring up some of the points that he wanted to mention here. Host Set the stage for our listeners, please, and give us a brief overview of the article. Malzac So, our article looked at Korea—North Korea, in particular—as a policy problem, and argued that it is a under-prioritized issue. We did a comparison of North Korea and the issues and the threats emanating from North Korea and also Russia and the degradation of Russia in Ukraine, making an argument that strategic prioritization needs to be shifted and that North Korea needs to be elevated as a more severe threat. We also provided one recommendation on how you might do that through restructuring the combatant commands. For today, I wanted to really focus on the problem-framing piece of it—understanding the North Korea problem and understanding how we got here. Host Let’s start with the impeachment issue. Can you put the current South Korean impeachment issue into context for us? Malzac Yes. So, obviously one of the biggest news events coming out of South Korea recently is the impeachment of President Yoon [Suk-Yeol]. It’s hard to talk about South Korea as an ally or the Korean Peninsula as a strategic battle space without addressing that elephant in the room. There’s a lot that has been published on the impeachment issue in a variety of media with a lot of very, I don’t want to say inflammatory, but headlines that are there to draw attention. So, for example, in January an article was released in Foreign Affairs entitled “Can South Korea’s Democracy Survive? (https://www.foreignaffairs.com/south-korea/can-south-koreas-democracy-survive)”—very provocative title. But if you actually open up the article, the author says [that] South Korean democracies—the institutions—are healthy and sound. And the author actually goes into showing that South Korea faces a lot of the same problems that most modern democracies are facing today, things like polarization, extremism, misinformation, and those types of problems. So, the…
Not rated yet