Decisive Point Podcast – Ep 5-29 – Richard D. Hooker Jr. – “Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander: A Reappraisal”
From Decisive Point Podcast · · 12 min
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Description
In this episode, Richard D. Hooker argues that the historical assessment of Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force in World War II lacks objectivity and balance. While we will never know if other generals would have outperformed Eisenhower, several leaders were available—all senior to Eisenhower at the outbreak of the war and with superior professional résumés.
E-mail usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.
Podcast record date: November 7, 2024
Keywords: Dwight D. Eisenhower, World War II, strategy, command, Joint campaign
Episode Transcript
Stephanie Crider (Host)
You are listening to Decisive Point (https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Podcasts/Decisive-Point-Podcast/). The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.
I'm talking with Richard D. Hooker today, the author of “Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander: A Reappraisal,” which you can find in the Autumn 2024 (https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol54/iss3/) issue of Parameters. Hooker is a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council and senior associate at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. He is the former National Security Council senior director for Europe and Russia and authored The High Ground: Leading in Peace and War, which was published by Casemate in 2023.
Welcome to Decisive Point, Richard.
Richard D. Hooker
Thank you. It's great to be here.
Host
How did Eisenhower’s lack of prior combat command experience affect his performance as Supreme Allied Commander?
Hooker
Well, I think first of all, it is important to give some credit where credit is due. Eisenhower began the war as a lieutenant colonel and rose in some 23 months to four stars. As the Supreme Commander he superintended, really, the largest Joint campaign in probably military history up to that point, which was ultimately successful in a little over 10 months. So, that’s a major achievement.
I think what we’re wrestling with here [is] was he the best qualified person, and how did his background help him or hinder him in the performance of those remarkable duties? And, I think it’s fair to say that although he was clearly a highly intelligent and experienced middle-grade officer, the lack of professional experience in command of larger formations—and probably a lack of combat experience, as well—didn’t serve him as well as it otherwise might have done. There were other officers, in my opinion, who were far more experienced and senior who possibly could have done a little bit better job, and we can talk about that as we go forward in this discussion.
Host
Sure, I’m looking forward to hearing about that. Tell me, what were some of the key strategic errors that are attributed to Eisenhower, and how did they affect the course of the war?
Hooker
I think there are a number of those that are discussed in the article in Parameters and most of them have to do, in my opinion, with seizing or not seizing opportunities.
So, the first major error that I see in the European campaign in 1944 is a missed opportunity to trap two German field armies at Falaise during the breakout from the Normandy beachhead. At this time, Eisenhower is still in the UK [United Kingdom], and the overall ground commander is [British General Bernard Montgomery, commander of 21st Army Group]. So, I think it's fair to say that Eisenhower did not exert, really, a firm grasp of the operations that were going on at that time. There was a golden opportunity to close the gap at Falaise and trap a large number of German soldiers who, unfortunately, were able to escape and then form the basis for reconstituted units later on, which of course prolonged the war, and were directly responsible for many, many more Allied casualties.
The second opportunity, I…